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OPTIONAL SAFETY DEVICES:
HOW STRICT THE LIABILITY?
BRUCE D. BLACK*

As even the most myopic observer of the courthouse cavalcade is
aware, the current decade has witnessed an explosive proliferation of
claims against manufacturers. Increasingly, plaintiffs have sought to
recover against manufacturers in such actions under the nomenclature of "strict tort liability." This article will attempt to focus on
the development of legal principles in one narrow area of a manufacturer's legal responsibility under strict liability principles, to-wit,
the duty to provide standard safety devices. A safety device, as used
herein, refers to that limited class of articles which serve no functional purpose other than the protection of the reasonably foreseeable user. Seatbelts, locks and guards are examples of devices which
come within this definition of a safety device. Equipment which has
a functional or operational purpose as well as a secondary safety
benefit does not come within the definition.' This article will be
limited to those cases which deal with whether or not a manufacturer
has a duty to include a safety device, as opposed to cases which turn
on the question of whether the safety device provided was effective. 2
Finally, although a limited discussion of whether the seller or the
manufacturer is in a better position to anticipate foreseeable use, and
thus incorporate appropriate safety devices, is necessary, the focus of
the article will be on the duty of the manufacturer. 3
For decades courts have struggled with the question of when a
manufacturer's liability could be predicated upon the failure to
provide available safety devices. 4 Within the framework of traditional negligence principles, most courts attempted to resolve this
*Member New Mexico Bar; J.D. University of Michigan, 1971.
1. For a case involving such a device see Collins v. Ridge Tool Co., 520 F.2d 591 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert denied 424 U.S. 949 (1976).
2. E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Mathews, 291 So.2d 169 (Miss. 1974) and Roach v.
Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 525 P.2d 125 (1974).
3. For a case dealing with the liability of a supplier for failing to incorporate safety
devices, see Rourke v. Garza, 511 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974), aff'd530 S.W.2d 794
(1975). An excellent analysis of the factors involved in determining the extent to which a
manufacturer should be allowed to delegate the duty to attach a safety device to a supplier
may be found in Rios v. Niagra Machine & Tool Works, 12 I1l. App. 3d 739, 299 N.E.2d 86
(1973) affd 59 111.2d 79, 319 N.E.2d 12 (1974).
4. For an excellent discussion of the application of negligence principles to this issue
see Noel, Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 Yale L.J. 816 at
822-27 (1962).
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issue by resort to the "patent-latent" test. Using this method of
analysis, if a manufacturer failed to provide a safety device against a
danger which was patent or obvious, liability was denied.' Conversely, if a manufacturer failed to provide a safety device to protect
against a danger which was hidden or latent, recovery was allowed
under negligence principles.6 Application of this test, however, often
produced virtually irreconcilable decisions based on substantially
identical facts.' Courts and commentators, therefore, have expressed
increased dissatisfaction with the patent-latent rationale.' Indeed,
the case of Campo v. Scofield,9 perhaps the judicial cornerstone of

the patent-latent test, was recently overruled.'

0

Since strict liability principles have spread beyond foodstuffs and
5. Leistra v. Bucyrus Erie Co., 443 F.2d 157 (8th Cir. 1971); Seimer v. Midwest
Mower Corp., 286 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1961); Messina v. Clark Equip. Co., 263 F.2d 291
(2nd Cit. 1959); Mondshour v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. tl1 (D. Md. 1969);
Shanklin v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 254 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.W. Va. 1966) affd 383 F.2d
819 (4th Cit. 1967); Murphy v. Cory Pump & Supply Co., 47 Ill. App. 2d 382, 197
N.E.2d 849 (1964); Stevens v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 151 Kan. 638, 100 P.2d 723
(1940); Leathem v. Moore, 265 So.2d 212 (La. App. 1972); Albert v. J. & L. Eng'r Co.,
214 So.2d 212 (La. App. 1968); Blankenship v. Morrison Mach. Co., 255 Md. 241, 257
A.2d 430 (1969); Stevens v. Durbin-Durco, Inc., 377 S.W.2d 343 (S. Ct. Mo. 1964);
Bradshaw v. Blystone Equip. Co., of Nevada, 79 Nev. 441, 386 P.2d 396 (1963); Lewis v.
John Royle & Sons, 46 App. Div.2d 304, 362 N.Y.S.2d 262 (1974); Bartkewich v. Billinger,
432 Pa. 351, 247 A.2d 603 (1968); Yaun v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 253 Wis. 558, 34
N.W.2d 853 (1948).
6. Posey v. Clark Equip. Co., 409 F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1969); Tracy v. Finn Equip. Co.,
290 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1961); Rhoads v. Service Mach. Co., 329 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Ark.
1971); Lindroth v. Walgreen Co., 328 111.App. 362, 87 N.E.2d 307 (1949), aff'd 407 111.
121, 94 N.E.2d 847 (1950); Dudley Sports Co. v. Schmitt, 151 Ind. App. 217, 279
N.E.2d 266 (1972); Calkins v. Sandven, 256 Ia. 682, 129 N.W.2d 1 (1964); Hartmon v.
Nat'l. Heater Co., 240 Minn. 264, 60 N.W.2d 804 (1953); Shepard v. Rheem Mfg. Co.,
251 N.C. 751, 112 S.E.2d 380 (1960); Lindenberg v. Folson, 138 N.W.2d 573 (N.D.
1965); South Austin Drive-Inn Theatre v. Thomison, 421 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App.
1967).
7. Compare Lindroth v. Walgreen, 328 Ill. App. 362, 87 N.E.2d 307 (1949); aff'd 407
111.121, 94 N.E.2d 847 (1950) and McCormick v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154
N.W.2d 488 (1967) with Blissenback v. Yanko, 90 Ohio App. 557, 48 Ohio Op. 203, 107
N.E.2d 409 (1951).
8. Recent judicial disenchantment with the patent-latent test is typified by the
opinions in Davis v. Fox River Tractor Co., 518 F.2d 481 (10th Cir. 1975); Byrnes v.
Economic Mach. Co., 41 Mich. App. 192, 200 N.W.2d 104 (1972); Pike v. Hough Co., 2
Cal. 3d 465, 85 Cal Rptr. 629, 467 P.2d 229 (1970) and the dissenting opinion of Chief
Justice Clark in Messina v. Clark Equip. Co., 263 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1959). The growing
disenchantment of legal scholars with the patent-latent test is reflected in Marschall, An
Obvious Wrong Does Not Make a Right: Manufacturer's Liability for Patently Dangerous
Products, 48 N.Y.U.L.R. 1065 (1973); Noel, Manufacturers Negligence of Design or
Directions for Use of a Product, supra note 4; 1 Frumer & Freedman, Products Liability
Section 7.02; 2 Harper and James Torts 2815 (1958).
9. 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
10. Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 348 N.E.2d 571
(1976).
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ultrahazardous activities, a growing number of courts have rejected
the patent-latent test. At first glance, however, the decisions predicated on strict liability appear to be as irreconcilable as the negligence cases developed under the latent-patent rationale. No suitable
rule of thumb has yet appeared in this rapidly changing area.''
While it has been suggested that finders of fact, and particularly
juries, are ill-suited to pass upon the technical considerations a
manufacturer must make in incorporating safety features into its
design,' 2 they have accepted the challenge and struggled mightily
with the problem. Numerous decisions have held a manufacturer
should be subjected to strict liability for failure to incorporate a
given safety device on a particular product.' ' A plaintiff's success in
such situations frequently derived, at least in part, from the ability to

demonstrate that such safety devices were an integral part of a
competitor's product. In other situations, the plaintiff was able to
show that while no one in the industry had adopted such a safety
design, the safety device itself was available or at least feasible prior
to the time of manufacture. Numerous other courts have found that

a manufacturer could not be subjected to strict liability for failing to
develop or incorporate a given safety device.'" In these cases the
"patent" nature of the danger or the speculative nature of the safety
11. Professor John Wade, the Reporter for the Restatement Second of Torts, however,
has attempted to analyze the factors which affect courts' determinations of liability in
these cases. In his most recent and comprehensive analysis, Professor Wade has compiled
seven factors which a trier of fact should consider in determining whether a product is
"unreasonably dangerous." Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44
Miss. L.J. 825 (1973); Wade, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 19 S.W.L.J. 5 at 17
(1965), reprinted 32 A.L.A. Law 455 (1971).
12. For a thorough discussion of this subject see Henderson, Judicial Review of
Manufacturers Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 Col. L.R. 1531
(1973).
13. Davis v. Fox River Tractor Co., 518 F.2d 481 (10th Cit. 1975); Rodrigues v.
Ripley Ind., Inc., 507 F.2d 782 (1st Cit. 1974); Carpenter v. Koehring Co., 391 F. Supp.
206, 206 (E.D. Pa. 1975) aff'd without opinion 527 F.2d 644 (3d Cir. 1976); Wheeler v.
Standard Tool & Mfg. Co., 359 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331
F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Luque v. McLean, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443, 501 P.2d 1163
(1972); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 85 Cal. Rptr. 69, 467 P.2d 229 (1970);Wright v.
Manney-Harris, Inc., 68 Il. App.2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966); Casey v. Gifford Wood
Co., 61 Mich. App. 208, 232 N.W.2d 360 (1975); Higgins v. Paul Hardeman, Inc., 457
S.W.2d 943 (Mo. App. 1970); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d
1033 (1974); Helicoid Gauge Div. of Am. Chain & Cable Co. v. Howell, 511 S.W.2d 573
(Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Tiffany, 454 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970);
Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713 (1970).
14. Gates v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 458 (10th Cit. 1974); Van Dorpe v. Koyker
Farm Implement Co., 427 F.2d 91 (7th Cit. 1970); Harrison v. McDenna Power Equip.,
Inc., 381 F. Supp. 926 (S.D. Fla. 1974); Rios v. Niagra Mach. & Tool Works, 12 Ill.
2d 79, 319 N.E.2d 12 (1974); Askew v.
App.3d 739, 299 N.E.2d 86 (1973), afrd 59 Ill.
Howard Cooper Corp., 263 Or. 184, 502 P.2d 210 (1972).
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device has frequently played a role in denying the plaintiff recovery.
A close look at those few cases which have dealt with the question
of whether a manufacturer may avoid having his product declared
defective and/or unreasonably dangerous by giving the buyer the
choice of optional safety devices suggests a polestar may be rising in
this limited area of products liability. A careful analysis of the cases
dealing directly with this issue suggests that courts generally hold the
manufacturer liable where, in the absence of a standard safety device,
the product is inherently dangerous under all circumstances. If it is a
particular user, use or environment which creates the danger, however, an optional safety device may adequately prevent the product
from being defective or dangerous. In other words, the danger from
which the manufacturer is required to protect the foreseeable user is
a danger stemming from the product itself rather than its use in a
particular environment or a given set of circumstances. Where there is
nothing inherently or unavoidably dangerous about the product in all
circumstances, but the danger arises only in certain settings, the
courts have been much more reluctant to hold a manufacturer who
offered an optional safety device, rejected by the buyer, strictly
liable. This all assumes, of course, such a device may be incorporated
economically without destroying the general utility of the product.
The apparent trend away from the patent-latent negligence test to
the rationale suggested above is sanctified in some measure by the
language of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
That Section provides, in part, that
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject
to liability for physical harm thereby caused...
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the
seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product .... 1

Although Section 402A on its face is confined to a "seller" of
products, Comment f states that since the section applies to any
person engaged in the business of selling products, it applies to
manufacturers. ' 6
15. Restatement of Torts (1965).
16. For a good discussion of why a manufacturer's liability follows from the Restatement language see the New Mexico Court of Appeals decision in Deem v. Woodbine
Manufacturing Co., 89 N.M. 50, 546 P.2d 1207 at 1212, 1213 (Ct. App. 1976), rev'd 89
N.M. 172, 548 P.2d 452 (1976). Comment 1. § 402A further amplifies on the definition of
the manufacturer as a seller:
1. User or consumer. In order for the rule stated in this Section to apply, it
is not necessary that the ultimate user or consumer have acquired the
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The language of Section 402A, then, requires that in order to
subject a manufacturer to liability, his product must be in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer." The
requirement that the product be in a "defective condition" appears
to be particularly suited to the proposed test that the product must
be inherently dangerous in all circumstances.' 7
The proposed test is also especially adaptable to the increased
emphasis placed on "foreseeability" by the Restatement. Comment h
to Section 402A of the Restatement outlines the requirement of
foreseeability in the following terms:
h. A product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for
normal handling and consumption. If the injury results from
abnormal handling, as where a bottled beverage is knocked against a
radiator to remove the cap, or from abnormal preparation for use, as
where too much salt is added to food, or for abnormal consumption,
as where a child eats too much candy and is made ill, the seller is not
liable. Where, however, he had reason to anticipate that danger may
result from a particular use, as where a drug is sold which is safe only
in limited doses, he may be required to give adequate warning of the

danger (See Comment j), and a product sold without such a warning
is in a defective condition.
In terms of foreseeability, then, while a manufacturer must
anticipate the environment in which his product will normally be
used,18 the 'intended use' doctrine only requires the manufacturer
to foresee harm which may result from an "intended, proper or
normal use."' 9 When placed in the context of optional safety
devices, the requirement of foreseeability may be formulated as
follows: When is a given type of injury so foreseeable that a safety
device is mandated as standard on every product? If the machine is
dangerous for its intended or foreseeable use in all situations without
a specific safety device, the manufacturer is strictly liable for selling
the product without that device. If, on the other hand, the product
may be used for different purposes in different settings, the manufacturer may rely on the buyer to choose the safety device most
product directly from the seller, although the rule applies equally if he does
so. He may have acquired it through one or more intermediate dealers.
Consequently, the courts have had no difficulty in holding a manufacturer liable under
Section 402A even though he did not sell the product directly to the consumer.
17. See comments g. h. and j. of the Restatement of Torts § 402A (1965).
18. Gardner v. Q.H.S., Inc., 448 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1971); Larsen v. General Motors
Corporation, 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79
(4th Cir. 1962).
19. Helene Curtis Ind., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967) cert denied 391
U.S. 913 (1968); Otis Elevator Co. v. Wood, 436 S.W.2d 324 (Tex., 1968).
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suited to the use anticipated by the buyer. As will be seen in the
following discussion, this rationale can be applied only when the
manufacturer fully informs the buyer of the purpose and limitations
of the safety device. 2 0
Relatively few courts have been called upon to face the specific
question of whether a manufacturer can be held liable for merely
offering an optional safety device rather than incorporating it as
standard equipment on a given line of products. The courts have
frequently found that a safety device may be offered as optional
rather than standard if intended merely to protect against a danger
arising out of one particular use or user, or occurring in only one of
the potential environments.
The appellate courts of New Mexico have recently been confronted with this specific issue. In Deem v. Woodbine Manufacturing Company,2
both the New Mexico Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court considered whether offering a safety device as
optional was sufficient to avoid liability by a manufacturer of
hydraulic lifts. The Deems had ordered a reconditioned stove from
a local appliance dealer. In delivering the stove, the dealer's driver
lowered it on a hydraulic lift gate attached to a pickup truck. The
driver then took the stove to plaintiff's home and left the lift at
ground level. Four-year-old Eric Deem and his seven-year-old sister,
Lisa, observed the unloading, including the operation of the lift
gate via a control lever. Once the driver entered plaintiff's home,
Eric mounted the back of the pickup truck and began to operate
the control lever to raise and lower the hydraulic lift. While
operating the lift, Eric's foot became entangled in the lift causing
serious injury. The trial court, sitting without a jury, found that a
manual eyehook latching device was installed on the tailgate of the
pickup. When the lift was raised and the tailgate latched it would
be necessary to unhook the latches before the lift could be
operated. The trial court further found that if the driver had
raised the lift and latched the tailgate hooks, the accident in question would not have occurred. Lastly, the trial court found that
the defendant manufacturer offered an optional lock device which
prevented the lift from being operated without a key. Based on
20. When a seller fails to tell the reasonably foreseeable user of the availability of such
safety devices the effect is as if the safety devices were never offered. Helicoid Gauge
Div. of Am. Chain & Cable Co. v. Howell, 511 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970);
c.f Richey v. Sumoge, 273 F. Supp. 904 (D. Or. 1967).
21. 89 N.M. 50, 546 P.2d 1207 (Ct. App. 1976), rev'd, 89 N.M. 172, 548 P.2d 452
(1976).
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these findings, the court granted the manufacturer's motion to
dismiss at the close of the plaintiff's case.
In reversing the trial court's decision in Deem, the Court of
Appeals considered the optional safety issue at length. Judge Sutin,
speaking for himself and Judge Lopez, first pointed out that at
least one other manufacturer of similar hydraulic lifts had installed
the key lock system as a standard safety device. The majority
opinion also observed that the manufacturer must be "expected to
anticipate the environment which is normal for the use of his
product... ."2 2 Judge Sutin noted that the question of whether a
manufacturer may merely offer a safety device as optional is
appropriately analyzed under the rubric "design defect":
The lift gate had no safety devices on it. The defendant failed to
attach its optional lock device as a safety factor. We can appropriately consider this alternative design where liability is predicated
upon the doctrine of strict liability. 2 3
The court concluded that absent the optional safety lock device,
the hydraulic lift gate was defective:
The record established that the lock device system would have
prevented use by Eric of the hydraulic lift gate. It was designed by
defendant. It was available at a nominal expense and it constituted
a safe design. Absent the safety factor the lift gate was unreasonably dangerous for use by Eric. If the lock system had been installed,
Woodbine would have had a good defense to special (sic) liability.
We hold as a matter of law that defendant Woodbine had a duty
to adopt the lock device system as a safe method of preventing
24
injury to children.
In finding that the lift gate absent the optional safety device was
defective, the New Mexico Court of Appeals did not focus upon
the fact that it would be defective only in an environment where
small children had access to the machine. This was emphasized by
the fact that the lift gate also contained a written warning to the
operator to keep hands out of the moving parts. Such a warning
would obviously not be decipherable, however, by a four-year-old
child.
Judge Hernandez dissented from the majority opinion on the
22. Id. at 57, 546 P.2d at 1214.
23. Id at 56, 546 P.2d at 1213.
24. Id. at 57, 546 P.2d at 1214.
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ground that the decision represented an "unsupported" extension
of § 402A to reach optional safety devices. 2
The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
and affirmed the trial court. After quoting the history of the case,
the Supreme Court merely stated, "The opinion of the Court of
Appeals, is disapproved. We direct that it not be cited as
precedent." 2"6 From this cryptic opinion it is difficult to determine
what factors the Supreme Court weighed in rejecting the contention that the manufacturer was legally obligated to incorporate the
lock key device as standard rather than merely offering it as
optional. The Court's holding, however, is consistent with the test
advanced herein. The lift itself was not inherently dangerous in all
situations in the absence of the optional safety lock. It was only
where one who could not read was given unrestricted access to the
lift that it became dangerous. If the truck driver in the Deem case
had not operated the lift in front of the children, and left the gate
down and unlatched while leaving the key in the ignition, no
safety device would have been necessary. Furthermore, it may be
surmised that since the truck driver left the keys in the ignition, he
would probably have left the key in the safety lock when he went
into the Deem residence. Indeed, the lock itself was only designed
to prevent use by unskilled operators who could not read the
warning.
The issue of standard versus option safety devices was again
presented in Jasper v. Skyhook Corporation."'7 Again the court of
appeals held that the manufacturer's offer of an optional safety
device was not sufficient to avoid liability, and again the New
Mexico Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals.
In Jasper, plaintiff's decedent, Malvin Mack Brown, was assisting
his supervisor in installing an advertising sign near a highway.
Brown and his supervisor were using a large crane manufactured by
the defendant, Skyhook Corporation, to lift the sign into place.
Both the supervisor and decedent knew of the presence of overhead high voltage lines since they had been specifically warned
about the same by the owner of the business where the sign was
being installed. While the supervisor lifted the sign pole with the
crane, Brown was to steady and guide the pole into the desired
position. During this process, the supervisor heard Brown scream
25. Id. at 59, 546 P.2d at 1216.
26. 89 N.M. 172, 548 P.2d 452 (1976).
27. 89 N.M. 98, 547 P.2d 1140 (Ct. App. 1976) rev'd. 90 N.M. 143, 560 P.2d 934
(1977).
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and looked over to see that the lift cable which Brown was holding
had come into contact with the overhead power line.
Plaintiff argued that the defendant was negligent in not including
either an insulated link or proximity warning device as standard
equipment on the crane. The proper size and voltage insulated link
would have prevented any electricity from being transmitted
through the load line to the lifting hook. At the time of manufacture, no one in the industry installed insulated links as standard
equipment. Insulated links were, however, available from the
defendant, as well as other manufacturers, as additional safety
options. A proximity warning device is a signal alarm which would
create a sound and/or light warning when the lift came within a
given distance of high power lines. At the time of the manufacture
of the crane in question, no manufacturer offered this device as
either a standard or optional safety feature. At the trial, evidence
was introduced showing that a guide rope which would not have
conducted electricity was available to decedent but that he did not
ordinarily use it. The evidence indicated there were other safety
measures available at the job site but not used in this instance. The
district court granted the defendant manufacturer a directed
verdict at the close of plaintiff's case.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
directed verdict in Jasper prior to the New Mexico Supreme
Court's decision in the Deem case. Judge Sutin, again writing for
himself and Judge Lopez considered the optional safety device
from the perspective of the defense of assumption of risk. Relying
on a New Jersey case discussed below2" Judge Sutin maintained
that a manufacturer could not rely upon a seller or purchaser to
determine which optional safety devices might be appropriate for
the buyers' intended use. The court stated:
In determining issues of contributory negligence in the form of
assumption of risk, or the claim of misuse of the crane, defendant
cannot rely on the expectation that Electrical Products, or
decedent,2 would provide a safety device for the crane. This is not
relevant. 9
Judge Hernandez again dissented from the majority on the ground
that the extension of Section 402A to optional safety devices was
not appropriate.
The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
28. Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
29. 89 N.M. at 102, 547 P.2d at 1144.
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decision and reinstated the trial court's verdict in favor of the
manufacturer. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice
Oman framed the issue in the following terms: "[W] e must decide
whether the failure of a seller to include an optional safety device
as part of the product may be considered as a sale of the product in a
'defective condition' "3 The Supreme Court found that failure to
incorporate a device could, in the proper circumstances, constitute a
defective condition of the product. 3 1 In resolving whether the instant case provided the "proper circumstances," the Court focused
on the fact that the crane was dangerous only when used in the
vicinity of high voltage lines and that the manufacturer had included
a specific warning as to the use of the product in such an environment:
The crane rig had been used by Signs, Inc. for five years, had
performed well, and no injury had resulted. Obviously, it was not
unreasonably dangerous within the contemplation of the ordinary
consumer or user of such a rig when used in the ordinary ways
and for the ordinary purposes for which such a rig is used. See,
§ 402A, Comment i. Furthermore, even though Skyhook had
knowledge that the rig might be used in areas where overhead high
voltage lines were present, they placed on the boom a clearly
visible written warning that 'all equipment shall be so positioned,
equipped or protected so that no part shall be capable of coming
within ten feet of high voltage lines.' There is no contention that
this warning was inadequate, had it been heeded. Skyhook, as the
seller, could reasonably assume that the warning would be read
and heeded. And had it been heeded, the crane was not in a
defective
condition nor unreasonably dangerous. (Emphasis
32
added.)

The Court then went on to point out that in light of the
explicit warning the crane could not be held defective merely because the manufacturer failed to include an optional safety device
as standard:
Since there was no defect in the crane rig unreasonably dangerous
to the decedent within the contemplation of the strict liability
concept enunciated in § 402A, there was no culpable conduct on
the part of Skyhook which could have proximately caused the
accident and the resulting death. 3
30.
31.
32.
33.

90 N.M. at 147, 560 P.2d at 938.
Id.
Id.
Id at'148, 560 P.2d at 939.

Summer 1978]

OPTIONAL SAFETY DEVICES

In the Skyhook case, then, the New Mexico Supreme Court held
that a manufacturer need not provide an optional safety device
where the product is not dangerous in its normal environment.
Even when the product may foreseeably be used in a dangerous
environment, the manufacturer will not be held liable for not including a safety device as standard if it provides an adequate warning
appropriate in the cirucmstances. Whether or not the warning is
adequate turns on considerations enunciated in Comment J to
Section 402A of the Restatement.
In Willeford v. Mayrath Company,3 4 the Illinois Court of
Appeals also reached a decision consistent with the theory that a
manufacturer has a duty to incorporate safety devices as standard
only where the product is inherently dangerous in all situations.
The plaintiff in that case was a twelve-year-old boy who lost a leg
when it became caught in the spinning power shaft of a farm
elevator. The elevator was approximately two years old and had
been purched by a neighboring farmer from a local farm products
supply. The seller had a stock of various parts available for assembly into elevators. The buyer could select either a mount for a
motor, or an attachment for a power takeoff from a standing
tractor or other motor. Among the parts offered as "standard,"
but at an increased cost, was a shield which could be fastened to
the elevator to cover the exposed universal joint in the event a
power takeoff was chosen as the power source. Although the buyer
chose the power takeoff he chose not to order this "optional"
safety device. Plaintiff brought suit on both negligence and strict
products liability. At trial there was conflicting evidence as to
whether the supplier had urged the buyer to purchase the shield.
The trial court struck the strict liability count and entered
judgment on the jury verdict for the plaintiff on the negligence
count.
The Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal
of the strict liability claim and reversed the judgment in favor of
the plaintiff on the negligence theory. Speaking for the majority,
Justice Richards made little distinction between negligent design
theory and strict tort liability for a defectively designed product.
As the majority opinion noted, in either case the burden is on the
plaintiff to show the existence of a defective condition at the time
the elevator left the manufacturer's control. Although the court
focused heavily upon the sequence of the "manufacture" (i.e.,
assembly of the product by the supplier) the court did note that it
34. 7 Ill. App.3d 357, 287 N.E.2d 502 (1972).
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was the purchaser's choice not to incorporate the appropriate
safety device. On this issue Justice Richards said simply:
The plaintiff, having failed to prove that the shield so provided by
the defendant was inadequate for the protection required here, it
cannot be here held that defendant is guilty of negligently
designing an unreasonably dangerous elevator.
Presiding Justice Trapp specially concurred and resorted to the
"patent" rationale pointing out the purchaser must have been
aware of the potential hazard. Justice Craven dissented on the
ground that since "a shield as an integral part of the machinery
unreasonably danwould have kept this machine from being
3
6
elevator.
every
on
required
was
it
gerous,"
The New Jersey Superior Court adopted the rationale and came
very close to enunciating the general rule presented herein in
3
Sanner v. Ford Motor Company. 1 In that case, the United States
Army ordered numerous custom jeeps from the defendant. The
Army design did not include roll bars or seat belts. Plaintiff was
injured when the jeep in which he was riding overturned. He sued,
alleging the lack of such safety devices made defendant strictly
liable. The trial court granted summary judgment on the grounds
that: (1) defendant had no duty to install seat belts; (2) plaintiff
could not show a dangerous defect; and (3) defendant was precluded from adding such safety devices by Army specifications. In
rendering this decision, the court recognized that safety devices
should not be allowed to unnecessarily restrict the functional
utility of a product in circumstances where the safety device does
not offer protection:
In deciding the existence of a duty by the manufacturers to install
seat belts in this instance, the utility and purpose of the particular
vehicle must be considered. Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk A. C.
supra at 1072; Dyson v. General Motors Corp., supra at 1073. This
rule is the means by which the Secretary of Transportation is
directed to establish motor vehicle safety standards. 15 U.S.C.A.
1381 et seq. As to each Federal safety standard proposed, the
reasonableness, practicability and aptness of each is to be weighed
as to each particular category of motor vehicle ....

Even under

this act a duty is not imposed across the board, but rather certain
factors are considered as to each particular type of vehicle to
35. Id. at 363, 287 N.E.2d at 506.
36. Id. at 366, 287 N.E.2d at 509.
37. 144 N.J. Super 1, 364 A.2d 43 (1976).
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ensure that the safety requirements to be imposed are reasonable,
practicable and appropriate. 3 8

The court then pointed out that although in most instances seat
belts and roll bars would be a valuable safety option, for the Army's
purpose it would seriously limit the functional utility of the vehicle:
The intended use and purpose of this jeep, as determined by the
Army, eliminated the installation of a seat belt or roll bar. The
proposed installation of seat belts was rejected by the Army
because occupants could be compromised due to deterred egress
and escape in tactical situations as well as enhancing injuries in the

event of a roll-over. The roll bar was rejected because it compromised some of the intended uses of the vehicle. Thus, the
Army in its discretion excluded seat belts and roll bars as a design

requirements of this jeep. 3 9

Finally, while a jeep without seat belts and roll bars might be
considered dangerous in most environments, it could not be so
termed when used in the military setting: "In order to establish a
design defect it is necessary to show that the design is dangerously
defective in comparison to similar products which are put to the
same or similar use. 4" In affirming 4' the trial court, the Appellate
Division found the fact that Ford had manufactured the jeep in strict
compliance with government specifications as required by its contract shielded it from liability.
In those cases where the courts have found a manufacturer
strictly liable for failing to incorporate an optional safety device as
standard equipment, the product has generally been one which was
inherently dangerous, regardless of use, user or environment. Two
companion cases presented to the Supreme Court of New Jersey
support the author's theory. In Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing
Corporation4 2 and Finnegan v. Havir Manufacturing Corporation,4 plaintiffs brought suit for injuries to their hands while
using presses manufactured by Havir. With the exception of a
guard over the flywheel, there were no safety devices on either
press. Both presses were several feet high with a ram, die and foot
pedal. The operator would put the raw material into the press and
depress the foot pedal causing the ram to descend and punch a
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id at 6, 364 A.2d at 45.
Id at 7, 364 A.2d at 45-46.
Id. at 7, 364 A.2d at 46.
154 N.J. Super 407, 381 A.2d 805 (1977).
60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972).
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pattern into the material. Plaintiffs both introduced experts who
testified that at the time the presses were sold various safety
devices which would have prevented the operators' hands from
being in line with the action of the press were on the market.
There was a push button starting device with the button so constructed as to require the operator to place both hands on the
buttons before the press would activate. (There was evidence Havir
offered this safety device on its larger presses, but not on the
model involved in these suits.) A second device was a guard rail or
gate to prevent the operator's hand from entering the area once
the machine-was activated. Although plaintiffs' experts conceded
that in accordance with custom in the industry the manufacturer
generally did not include such safety devices on presses, but left
that to the purchaser, there was evidence in Finnegan that at least
one competing manufacturer incorporated the two button activation device as standard on its presses. Furthermore, in Bexiga the
plaintiff's expert testified that the purchasers "almost never"
purchased any of the available safety devices from specialty supply
companies. In Bexiga the trial court granted defendant's motion
for involuntary dismissal at the close of plaintiff's case. In Finnegan the trial court granted defendant's motion for a judgment
n.o.v.
In both Bexiga and Finnegan the Supreme Court of New Jersey
reversed the trial court decisions. In Finnegan, the court stressed
the fact that the safety devices in question would be effective in
all situations without impeding the operation of the product.
However, from the evidence we think the jury could reasonably
infer that the two-hand push-button device is suitable for every
normal use of the machine. Several facts already referred to
already support our conclusion and bear repeating. First, it was
the opinion of plaintiffs expert that the push-button device
should be installed by the manufacturer as a 'minimum' and that
it was suitable to every use to which the press could be put.
Further, he said that installation of such a device by the manufacturer would be simple and not costly. Second, the Walsh catalogue
states that the two-hand guard is adaptable to all power press
work. Third, plaintiffs' expert testified that one manufacturer of
power presses, Federal, installs the push-button device before the
sale of its machine. 4 4
The court also emphasized that the defendant's own expert testified that the manufacturer knew of several injuries to press opera44. Id. at 421, 290 A.2d at 291.
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tors resulting from the purchaser's failure to install safety devices.
In light of this and in spite of the fact that New Jersey law required a factory owner to equip its power presses with power
guards, the New Jersey Court held that the manufacturer could not
shift the burden to the purchaser to supply safety guards.4" In
Bexiga the court noted that although § 402A(1 )(b) made it permissible for the manufacturer to allow the supplier or purchaser to
choose the appropriate safety device, that subsection should not be
applied. The New Jersey Court explained its reasoning as follows:
To the extent that the rule absolves the manufacturer of liability
where he may expect the purchaser to provide safety devices
(Restatement, supra, § 402A(1)(b)), it should not be applied.
Where a manufacturer places into the channels of trade a finished
product which can be put to use and which should be provided
with safety devices because without such it creates an unreasonable risk of harm, and where such safety devices can feasibly be
installed by the manufacturer, the fact that he expects that
someone else will install such devices should not immunize him.
The public interest in assuring that safety devices are installed
demands more from the manufacturer than to permit him to leave
such a critical phase of his manufacturing process to the haphazard
conduct of the ultimate purchaser. The only way to be certain
that such devices will be installed on all machines-which clearly
the public interest requires-is to place the duty on the manufacturer where it is feasible for him to do so. 4 6
The reasoning applied by the New Jersey Supreme Court in

Finnegan and Bexiga not only appears to be somewhat circular, it
begs the question. The court starts with the assumption that the

product, sans safety option, "creates an unreasonable risk of
harm." Needless to say, if that is in fact the case, liability should
follow.
The fallacy of the New Jersey departure from the rule enunciated in § 402A(l)(b) can be seen when carried to its logical
conclusion. Under the New Jersey rationale, a manufacturer could
no longer offer any safety device as optional. Each product would
have to contain every possible safety device for every forseeable
use. For a multipurpose product like a crane this could greatly
increase the expense and decrease the efficiency of the product.4 7
45. Id at 422, 290 A.2d at 286, 291.
46. 60 N.J. at 410, 290 A.2d at 285.
47. For a good discussion of the interrelationship between the restrictions on efficiency
of a multi-purpose product and the user's requirements of safety in a particular situation,
see Rios v. Niagra Machine & Tool Works, 12 Ill. App.3d 739, 299 N.E.2d 86 (1973), aff'd.
59 1IU.2d 79, 319 N.E.2d 12 (1974).
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Other courts have recognized that it is not reasonable to require a
manufacturer to incorporate standard safety devices which would
4
render the product basically inoperable. 8 Common sense also
dictates a manufacturer should not be required to include numerous expensive safety devices which would not be useful for the
product's usual function.
While the New Jersey Court's rationale is open to debate, the
results reached are nonetheless consistent with the thesis advanced
herein. The power presses involved in Bexiga and Finnegan were
dangerous for all uses for which they could foreseeably be
adopted. Whereas the hydraulic lift in Deem was only dangerous
around children who could not read the warning and the cranes
involved in Jasper were only dangerous when used in the vicinity
of power lines contrary to the warning, the power presses involved
in Bexiga and Finnegan were dangerous to the foreseeable operator
in all circumstances. Thus the danger in the power press involved
in Bexiga and Finnegan was inherent in the use of the press itself
and not dependent upon any particular use, user or environment.
The theory advanced also appears consistent with the decision in
Richey v. Sumoge.4 9 In that case, Caldwell and Sons, Inc. manufactured farm machinery, including brush cutters. Defendant
shipped a brush cutter to a supply center which sold it to the
Sumoges. The Sumoges hired one Nowlin Richey as a ranch hand
to operate the brush cutter. Richey was injured when his leg was
caught in the drive shaft of the brush cutter. Plaintiff brought suit
against the manufacturer on the theory that it defectively designed
the brush cutter, marketed it without a standard guard around the
drive shaft gear pin and failed to notify prospective customers that
an optional guard was available or warn purchasers of the dangers
inherent in operating the machine without such a guard. The
evidence indicated that although Caldwell manufactured a guard
for the particular universal joint, and Sumoge was aware of the
guard, no such guard was purchased. The jury returned a verdict
against both Sumoge and Caldwell in the mount of $93,000.
The court in Richey ordered a remittur, or in lieu thereof, a
new trial. In denying the manufacturer's request for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, the court viewed the optional safety
device not as a potential remedy of any defect in the product, but
rather as itself evidence of such a defect:
IT] he issue of strict liability was properly submitted against de48. Albert v. J. & L. Engineering Co., 214 So.2d 212 (La. App. 1968).
49. 273 F. Supp. 904 (D. Or. 1967).
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fendant Caldwell. Caldwell manufactured a guard for the particular
joint which caused the injury and that fact could well be viewed
as evidence that the product, as that word is used in Section 402A

of the Restatement Torts, 2d, was in a defective condition, unreasonably dangerous to the user. 50

At first glance the facts in Richey appear indistinguishable from
those in Willeford v. Mayrath. A closer look, however, reveals that
the brush cutter in Richey, although shipped disassembled, was
only designed for one method of assembly. This method of
assembly and the 'ultimate use thereafter made the brush cutter
dangerous without the guard. In this case, therefore, as the court
correctly perceived, the optional guard should not have been
optional. The farm elevator in Willeford could be assembled in
either of two formations. The guard in that case was useful only if
the power takeoff option was chosen.
Although dealing with the safety device issue primarily from the
warning perspective, the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in
Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Company" meets the proposed test.
In that case the plaintiff was injured when a sanding machine rejected a piece of fiberboard and threw it back into plaintiff's
abdomen. Plaintiffs .employer had declined to purchase an automatic feeder, which would have prevented the accident, from the
defendant manufacturer, substituting instead its own semi-automatic feeder. The manufacturer, knowing the dangers of manually
feeding this model machine, neglected to point this out to plaintiff's employer while touring the latter's plant and seeing the
machine fed manually. There was evidence, however, that the
manufacturer advised plaintiff's employer of the potential safety
aspects of the fully automatic feeder. Plaintiff sued the manufacturer alleging the sander did not contain "any guards, catches,
shields, barricades or similar devices to protect the operator."5 2
Plaintiff introduced evidence that a line of small metal teeth could
have been installed which would have prevented regurgitation of
material toward the operator. Plaintiff also proved that the defendant manufacturer regularly installed such teeth on its smaller
sanders and that after plaintiff's accident such teeth were incorporated as standard on the model involved. The trial court directed a
verdict for the manufacturer.
The Oregon Supreme Court reversed with instruction that the
50. Id at 907.
51. 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
52. Id at 488, 525 P.2d at 1034.
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jury determine whether the product was dangerously defective. The
Oregon Court held that the jury could have found that once the
defendant became aware of the fact its machine was being used
without an automatic feeder, it should have "warned plaintiff's
employer either to feed it automatically or to use some safety
device."' '
While at first glance Phillips may appear contrary to Willeford, a
careful consideration supports the opposite conclusion. In Willeford
the manufacturer's product could be used two ways, one of which
was perfectly safe without a safety device and there was evidence
that the buyer was informed of this fact. In Phillips the product
was only safe if an automatic feeder, with the safety throwback
teeth, was used and it was undisputed the buyer was not told this.
In Phillips, then, the product was basically unsafe without the
safety device and it should therefore have been standard.
One recent case which clearly does not fit the author's thesis is
In that case, plaintiff's
Roy v. Star Chopper Company, Inc."
employer, A.M.S., had ordered a machine from the defendant
manufacturer. The employer had the machine built to specifications and expressly represented to the defendant that A.M.S.
would install all necessary safety devices. Plaintiff's employer failed
to install such safety features and plaintiff was injured while using
the machine. Relying on Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing Corporation, supra, the district court held that a manufacturer must install
an all-purpose safety device on all equipment and that this rule
should apply even "where the purchaser expressly undertakes to
install devices."" 5 The court went on to hold, however, that the
purchaser who custom orders the product without necessary safety
devices impliedly agrees to indemnify the manufacturer from liability. The advantage of the rationale outlined above was explained
by saying that it had the advantage of placing the burden of
proving the indemnity case on the manufacturer. However, since
the manufacturer would no doubt prove the same facts in defending a products liability case, the decision in Sanner v. Ford
Motor Company seems to resolve this problem in a much more
satisfactory fashion.
In conclusion, then, while the rule advanced herein has not been
effectively enunciated by a court dealing specifically with safety
options, both logic and precedent seem to suggest such a test. If a
53. Id at 497, 525 P.2d at 1039.
54. 442 F. Supp. 1010 (D.R.I. 1977).
55. Id at 1021.
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product is inherently dangerous under all circumstances in the
absence of an available safety device, justice demands that the
device be incorporated as standard. If, on the other hand, the
product is only dangerous in the hands of a limited class of users
or a particular environment, logic suggests the purchaser would be
better able to anticipate such use and should have the burden of
purchasing safety options made available by the manufacturer.

